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JURISDICTIONAL S1ATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
§§ 78A-3-102(3)0') and 78A-4-103(2)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. WAS THE 1 RIAL COURT CORRECT IN CONCLUDING THAT ALL 
CLEAN IS NOT ENTITLED TO A MECHANICS' LIEN UNDER UTAH 
CODE § 38-1-3? 
Standard of Review 
Since All Clean, Inc. d.b.a. The Flood Co. (hereinafter "All Clean") has not 
assigned error to the operative findings of fact or adequately marshaled the evidence in 
support of the operative findings of fact, whether All Clean is entitled to a mechanics' 
lien under Utah Code § 38-1-3 is a question of statutory interpretation and therefore 
constitutes a question of law for which "no deference need be given the trial court's 
conclusions." Foothill Park, LC v. Judston, Inc., 2008 UT App 113, If 4, 182 P.3d 924. 
Preservation for Appeal 
This issue was addressed in closing arguments at trial. [R. 295 (Trial Transcript at 
63, 82)]. 
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO AWARD TIMBERLINE 
PROPERTIES ITS ATTORNEYS' FEES PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE § 
38-1-18 AS THE "SUCCESSFUL PARTY" ON ALL CLEAN'S 
MECHANICS' LIEN CLAIM? 
Standard of Review 
Since the operative facts are not disputed, the issue of whether the trial court erred 
in failing to award attorneys' fees to Timberline Properties, James B. Farreil, and Farreil 
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J. DeHart (hereinafter collectively "Timberline Properties") is a question of statutory 
interpretation and therefore constitutes a question of law for which "no deference need be 
given the trial court's conclusions." Foothill Park, LC v. Judston, Inc., 2008 UT App 
11344, 182 P.3d 924. 
Preservation for Appeal 
The issue of attorneys' fees under section 38-1-18 was addressed in closing 
arguments at trial. [R. 295 (Trial Transcript at 85-86)]. 
STATUTES DETERMINATIVE ON APPEAL 
I. UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-3 (2007). 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing or 
renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or improvement 
of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any manner and licensed 
architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, 
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have 
rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the 
property upon or concerning which they have rendered service, performed labor, or 
furnished or rented materials or equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor 
performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at 
the instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his authority as agent, 
contractor, or otherwise except as the lien is barred under Section 38-11-107 of the 
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. This lien shall attach only to 
such interest as the owner may have in the property. 
O. UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-18 (2009). 
(1) Except as provided in Section 38-11-107 and in Subsection (2), in any action brought 
to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a 
reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the 
action. 
(2) A person who files a wrongful lien as provided in Section 38-1-25 is not entitled to 
recover attorneys5 fees under Subsection (1). 
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(3) A party against whom any action is brought to enforce a lien under this chapter may 
make an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If 
the offer is not accepted and the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more 
favorable than the offer, the offeree shall pay the costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the 
offeror after the offer was made. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NYI'IIKMWTHECASE. 
All Clean asserted causes of action against Timberline Properties for unjust 
enrichment and to foreclose a mechanics' lien. [R. 1, 5-6 (Complaint ffif 28-34)]. The 
trial court found in favor of All Clean on its unjust enrichment claim and awarded 
judgment against Timberline Properties in the total amount of $ 1,841.07. [R. 263, 263-
64 (Judgment f 1); R. 266, 269 (Conclusions of Law ^ 5)]. However, the trial court 
found in favor of Timberline Properties on All Clean's mechanics' lien claim, holding 
that "[t]his is not a mechanic's lien case because the work done by [All Clean] is not the 
type which entitles [All Clean] to have a lien upon the property of [Timberline 
Properties]." [R. 266, 269 (Conclusions of Law If 6)]. 
The trial court did not award either party its attorneys' fees. [R. 263, 263-64 
(Judgment |^ 1)]. After the trial Timberline Properties remitted a check to All Clean in 
the amount of $ 1,841.07—the full amount of the Judgment—to fully satisfy the 
Judgment. See Affidavit of Farrell J. DeHart 14, attached hereto as Exhibit "A". All 
Clean negotiated the check and then served its Notice of Appeal. [Affidavit of Farrell J. 
DeHart If 5, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"; R. 271, 271-73 (Notice of Appeal)]. 
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Accordingly, at issue on appeal is whether All Clean waived its right to appeal the 
Judgment or is otherwise estopped from attacking the Judgment on appeal pursuant to the 
acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine. If the acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine does not 
preclude All Clean's appeal, the Court must interpret and apply Utah Code § 38-1-3 to 
the trial court's unchallenged findings of fact to determine whether the trial court 
correctly concluded that All Clean was not entitled to a mechanics' lien. The Court must 
also determine whether the trial court erred in failing to award Timberline Properties its 
attorneys' fees as the successful party on All Clean's mechanics' lien claim. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS/DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW. 
All Clean filed a Complaint on December 19, 2008. [R. 1, 1-15 (Complaint)]. A 
short bench trial was conducted before the Honorable Judge W. Brent West on February 
1, 2010. [R. 237, 237-38 (Bench Trial Minutes); R. 295 (Bench Trial Transcript)]. 
Following the bench trial Judge West concluded as follows: (1) that All Clean was 
entitled to recover $1,841.07 pursuant to its unjust enrichment claim; (2) that All Clean 
was not entitled to recover on its mechanics' lien claim; and (3) that neither party was 
entitled to an award of attorneys' fees. [R. 295 (Trial Transcript at 86-90); R. 266, 269 
(Conclusions of Law fflf 5-6)]. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
All Clean performed "work" or a "repair" on Property owned by Timberline 
Properties. [R. 266, 267 (Findings of Fact fflf 2,6)]. Timberline Properties paid All Clean 
$3,275.00. [R. 266, 268 (Findings of Fact U 10)]. After accepting Timberline Properties' 
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$3,275.00 payment, All Clean asserted that there was an outstanding balance of 
$1,947.38. [R. 266, 268 (Findings of Fact ^ 11)]. All Clean then filed a "Notice of 
Mechanics' Lien" and initiated this lawsuit. [R. 266, 268 (Findings of Fact If 12)]. 
The causes of action asserted by All Clean against Timberline Properties included 
unjust enrichment and mechanics' lien foreclosure. [R. 1, 5-6 (Complaint fflj 28-34)]. At 
the conclusion of a short bench trial the trial court found in favor of All Clean on its 
unjust enrichment claim and awarded judgment against Timberline Properties in the total 
amount of $1,841.07. [R. 263, 263-64 (Judgment % 1); R. 266, 269 (Conclusions of Law 
1f5)]. 
However, the trial court found in favor of Timberline Properties on All Clean's 
mechanics' lien claim, holding that "[t]his is not a mechanic's lien case because the work 
done by [All Clean] is not the type which entitles [All Clean] to have a lien upon the 
property of [Timberline Properties]." [R. 266, 269 (Conclusions of Law f 6)]. The trial 
court did not award either party its attorneys' fees. [R. 263, 263-64 (Judgment }^ 1)]. 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the trial court intentionally 
characterized the work performed by All Clean generally as "the work" or "the repair." 
[R. 266, 267 (Findings of Fact U 6), 269 (Conclusions of Law ffif 5-6)]. All Clean's 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law included the following paragraph 
specifically identifying the work allegedly performed: 
The work done by [All Clean] included the following: blocking and padding 
furniture; equipment setup, take down, and monitoring; water extraction from 
floors; application of antimicrobial agent; operation of air movers (fans) and 
dehumidifiers; and cleaning and deodorizing of carpets. 
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[R. 254, 255 (Proposed Findings of Fact % 6)]. 
Timberline Properties objected to this proposed finding of fad as follows: 
The Court's ruling from the bench did not include a finding with respect to the 
specific work performed by Plaintiff. The Court only referred to the "work or the 
repair," which is consistent with the evidence submitted inasmuch as Plaintiff did 
not present any testimony with respect to the specific work [] performed. 
[R. 241, 242 (Objection to Proposed Finding No. 6)]. On March 16, 2010, the trial court 
held a teleconference with counsel for All Clean and Timberline Properties to review 
Timberline Properties' objections to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. [R. 253, 253 (Telephone Conference Worksheet); R. 262, 262 (Minutes of 
Telephone Conference)]. 
As evidenced by the trial court's ultimate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, Timberline Properties' objection to a specific identification of "Ihe work" or "the 
repairs" allegedly performed by All Clean was well-taken by the trial court. [R. 266, 
266-69 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)]. Indeed, All Clean concedes that 
"[t]he trial court [] refused to make any detailed finding of fact identifying or describing 
'the work done by [All Clean].'" Brief of the Appellant at 13. 
On April 2, 2010, the trial court signed its Judgment and its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. [R. 263, 264 (Judgment); R. 266, 269 (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law)]. On March 22,2010, Timberline Properties tendered a check to 
All Clean in the amount of $1,841.07—the full amount of the Judgment— to fully satisfy 
the Judgment. [Affidavit of Farrell J. DeHart If 4, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"]. On 
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April 7, 2010, All Clean negotiated the check. [Affidavit of Farrell J. DeHart ^ 5, 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A"]. On April 30, 2010, All Clean initiated this appeal by 
serving its Notice of Appeal. [R. 271, 271-73 (Notice of Appeal)]. 
Thereafter Timberline Properties expressed to All Clean that it was selling a piece 
of property not involved in this lawsuit (but located in Weber County where the 
Judgment had been recorded) and requested that All Clean execute a Satisfaction of 
Judgment to acknowledge that the Judgment had been paid in full for the purpose of 
clearing title to the property. [Affidavit of Garrett A. Walker ^ 4, attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B"]. 
All Clean refused to execute a Satisfaction of Judgment. [Affidavit of Garrett A. 
Walker ^f 5-6, attached hereto as Exhibit "B"]. Although the property was still sold to a 
third-party, Timberline Properties was forced to place $3,673.00 in escrow since All 
Clean refused to execute a Satisfaction of Judgment acknowledging that the Judgment 
had been paid in full. [Affidavit of Farrell J. DeHart fflf 6-7, attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A"]. The funds are still being held in escrow. [Affidavit of Farrell J. DeHart f^ 8, 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A"]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. ALL CLEAN WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL OR IS OTHERWISE 
ESTOPPED FROM ATTACKING THE JUDGMENT ON APPEAL 
PURSUANT TO THE ACCEPTANCE-OF-THE-BENEFITS DOCTRINE, 
The trial court found in favor of All Clean on its unjust enrichment claim and in 
favor of Timberline Properties on All Clean's mechanics' lien claim. [R. 266, 269 
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(Conclusions of Law ffif 5-6)]. All Clean then accepted the benefits of the Judgment by 
obtaining payment of the Judgment in full. [Affidavit of Farrell J. DeHart fflf 4-5, 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A"]. As a result, All Clean waived its right to appeal or is 
otherwise estopped from attacking the Judgment on appeal pursuant to the acceptance-of-
the-benefits doctrine since All Clean's mechanics' lien claim is "inextricably tied" to its 
unjust enrichment claim. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT ALL CLEAN IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO A MECHANICS' LIEN. 
Mechanics' lien claimants bear the burden of establishing entitlement to a 
mechanics' lien. See, e.g., Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 172 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holding that "[t]he burden of proof is on [the lien claimant] to 
prove that it is entitled to the lien and has complied with the statute"). Among other 
requirements, Utah Code § 38-1-3 defines what services, material, and equipment must 
be used to entitle the person performing the services or furnishing or renting the materials 
or equipment to a mechanics' lien. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-3 (2007). 
In this case, All Clean did not provide the trial court with evidence sufficient to 
enable the trial court to find that the "work" or "repairs" performed by All Clean entitled 
All Clean to a mechanics' lien. Even if the trial court's findings of fact are disregarded 
and All Clean is allowed to assert it performed specific "work" or "repairs," the "work" 
or "repairs" performed by All Clean were still not used in a manner that would entitle All 
Clean to a mechanics' lien under section 38-1-3. 
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IIL ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
The trial court found in favor of Timberline Properties on All Clean's mechanics' 
lien claim. [R. 266, 269 (Conclusions of Law ^ 6)]. Consequently, Timberline Properties 
was the "successful party" and should have been awarded its attorneys' fees. See UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 38-1-18 (2009). Timberline Properties should also be awarded its 
attorneys' fees on appeal. Reeves v. Steinfeldt, 915 P.2d 1073, 1079 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996) (remanding a mechanics' lien case to the trial court for an award of attorneys fees 
incurred by the property owner in successfully defending the appeal). 
ARGUMENTS 
All Clean waived its right to appeal or is otherwise estopped from attacking the 
trial court's Judgment on appeal—and consequently this appeal should be dismissed— 
pursuant to its acceptance of the benefit of the Judgment. In any event, All Clean is not 
entitled to a mechanics' lien under Utah Code § 38-1-3. Although the trial court was 
correct in its determination that All Clean was not entitled to a mechanics' lien, it erred in 
not awarding attorneys' fees to Timberline Properties pursuant to Utah Code § 38-1-18. 
I. ALL CLEAN WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL OR IS OTHERWISE 
ESTOPPED FROM ATTACKING THE JUDGMENT ON APPEAL 
PURSUANT TO THE ACCEPTANCE-OF-THE-BENEFITS DOCTRINE. 
All Clean waived its right to appeal the trial court's Judgment by subsequently 
accepting the benefits of the Judgment. Alternatively, accepting the benefits of the 
judgment resulted in All Clean being estopped from attacking the Judgment on appeal. 
"Utah courts have long held that if a judgment is voluntarily paid, which is accepted, and 
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a judgment satisfied, the controversy has become moot and the right to appeal is waived." 
Turville v. J & J Properties, L.C., 2006 UT App. 305, t 44, 145 P.3d 1146 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). Similarly, "one who accepts a benefit under a 
judgment is estopped from later attacking the judgment on appeal." See Trees v. Lewis, 
738 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1987). 
On April 2, 2010, the trial court signed its Judgment and its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. [R. 263, 264 (Judgment); R. 266, 269 (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law)]. On March 22, 2010, Timberline Properties tendered a check to 
All Clean in the amount of $1,841.07—the full amount of the Judgment—to fully satisfy 
the Judgment. [Affidavit of Farrell J. DeHart J^ 4, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"]. On 
April 7, 2010, All Clean negotiated the check. [Affidavit of Farrell J. DeHart If 5, 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A"]. This constitutes an acceptance of the benefits of the 
Judgment. However, All Clean nevertheless initiated this appeal by serving its Notice of 
Appeal on April 30, 2010. [R. 271, 271-73 (Notice of Appeal)]. 
Although Utah's courts have acknowledged one exception to the acceptance-of-
the-benefits doctrine, this exception is inapplicable to this case. "An exception to this 
rule exists only if the appeal relates to a separate and distinct part of the controversy and 
the disposition of one cannot affect the disposition of the other." Robertson v. GEM Ins. 
Co., 828 P.2d 496, 504 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
We are in agreement with the general rule that if a judgment is voluntarily paid, 
which is accepted, and a judgment satisfied, the controversy has become moot and 
the right to appeal is waived. This is based upon the reasoning that when a 
controversy has come to rest the litigation should cease.... Therefore, the general 
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rule just stated does not usually prevent an appeal as to separate and independent 
claims where the controversy has not so come to rest. If a judgment is entered as 
to one part of a controversy, which is separate and distinct from another part, and 
the disposition of the latter cannot affect the disposition of the former, a party may 
accept the money or property to which he is entitled, and not be deemed to waive 
his right to appeal as to other independent claims which the court refused to grant. 
Jensen v. Eddy, 514 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Utah 1973). 
In this case the controversy has become moot and the right to appeal has been 
waived by All Clean because its mechanics' lien claim is not "separate and independent" 
or "separate and distinct" from its unjust enrichment claim. The transaction giving rise to 
All Clean's mechanics' lien claim is the same transaction giving rise to its unjust 
enrichment claim. Indeed, All Clean's mechanics' lien claim cannot stand independent 
of its unjust enrichment claim because the security afforded by a mechanics' lien 
presupposes an underlying debt. 
That a mechanics' lien claim is not "separate and distinct" from an unjust 
enrichment claim is underscored by the repeated use of the phrases "inextricably tied" 
and "inextricably intertwined" by Utah's courts in describing the relationship between 
mechanics' lien claims and unjust enrichment/breach of contract claims. See Ellsworth 
Paulsen Const Co. v. 51-SPR, LLC, 2006 UT App. 353, If 47, 144 P.3d 261 ("the 
breach of contract claim here was so inextricably tied to the mechanic's lien claim . . . it 
almost goes without saying that a breach of contract claim is typically such an integral 
part of a mechanics' lien claim"); Stonecreek Landscaping, LLC v. Bell, 2008 UT App. 
144, \ 9, WL 1822192 ("Stonecreek's claims for breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment, however, are so inextricably tied to its mechanic's lien claim") (internal 
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quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Cameron & Co., Inc. v. Kelly, 2002 UT 
App. 320, If 3, 2002 WL 31204494 (utilizing the phrase "inextricably intertwined").1 
The interwoven relationship between All Clean's mechanics' lien claim and its 
unjust enrichment claim is further manifest when it is considered that the Court may 
affirm the trial court's judgment regarding All Clean's mechanics' lie*i claim on alternate 
grounds that could affect the disposition of the trial court's judgment regarding All 
Clean's unjust enrichment claim. 
It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if 
it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though 
such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of 
its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged 
or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not 
considered or passed on by the lower court. 
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ]fl0, 52 P.3d 1158 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
For example, the Court may conclude that the record does not support the 
existence of a debt underlying All Clean's mechanics' lien claim. A legal conclusion to 
that effect would necessarily implicate the trial court's judgment regarding All Clean's 
unjust enrichment claim and could be drawn from the trial court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law relating to the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. [R. 266, 268 
(Findings of Fact ffif 8-9, 11), 269 (Conclusions of Law |jf 1-4)]. 
1
 "Published decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, and unpublished 
decisions of the Court of Appeals issued on or after October 1, 1998, may be cited as 
precedent in all courts of the State." UTAH R. APP. P. 30(f) (2010). 
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Alternatively, the Court may conclude after examining the record that the "work" 
or "repairs" performed by All Clean were such that All Clean was required to be a 
licensed contractor in order to bring this lawsuit. 
A contractor . . . may not . . . commence or maintain any action in any court of the 
state for collection of compensation for performing any act for which a license is 
required by this chapter without alleging and proving that the licensed contractor 
. . was appropriately licensed when the contract sued upon was entered into, and 
when the alleged cause of action arose. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-55-604 (2008). 
Although All Clean refers to itself as a licensed contractor in the Brief of the 
Appellant at 6, the trial court did not make such a finding in its findings of fact, and a 
thorough review of the record reveals that that no evidence was presented to the trial 
court that All Clean was ever a licensed contractor. [R. 266, 266-68 (Findings of Fact); 
R. 295 (Trial Transcript)]. Since All Clean did not allege and prove at trial that it was a 
licensed contractor, a conclusion by this Court that the "work" or "repairs" performed by 
All Clean were of a nature that required All Clean to prove that it was a licensed 
contractor in order to commence and maintain this action would necessarily implicate the 
trial court's judgment regarding All Clean's unjust enrichment claim. 
Given that the Court's disposition of All Clean's mechanics' lien claim could 
affect the trial court's disposition of All Clean's unjust enrichment claim, it cannot be 
argued that All Clean's mechanics' lien claim is "separate and distinct" from its unjust 
enrichment claim. Consequently, the acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine is applicable to 
the facts presented by this case and All Clean's appeal should be dismissed. 
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This conclusion is supported by the purpose of the acceptance-of-the-benefits 
doctrine: to protect the successful party from a shift in the burden of risk. 
We think that this rule is more than a technicality of common law designed to 
ensnare the unwary; the rule embodies a valid protection of the successful party in 
the trial court. An appellant who accepts the benefits of a judgment from which he 
is appealing accomplishes a significant shift in the burden of risk; he exposes the 
respondent to the possibility not only to a possible loss on appeal, but also the 
potential loss of the benefit he has provided to the appellant. 
See Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1987). 
In this case, Timberline Properties was the successful party on All Clean's 
mechanics' lien claim. [R. 266, 269 (Conclusions of Law f^ 6)]. By accepting Timberline 
Properties' check in the full amount of the judgment, All Clean has exposed Timberline 
Properties not only to the risk of loss on appeal but also to the risk that Timberline 
Properties will be forced to try to collect what it has already paid to All Clean if the Court 
finds that there is no underlying debt secured by the mechanics' lien claim. The 
acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine was designed to avoid this scenario. 
In addition, other legal theories that have been used by the courts to rationalize 
application of the acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine also support its application in this 
case. "The Utah Supreme Court has applied this general doctrine using diverse legal 
theories in its rationale, depending on the particular circumstances of the case." 
Cingolani v. Utah Power & Light Co., 790 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah Ct, App. 1990). These 
legal theories include waiver and estoppel. Id. 
In this case, All Clean waived its right to appeal the judgment by the act of 
negotiating a check from Timberline Properties for the full amount of the judgment. All 
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Clean should also be estopped from appealing the Judgment. Acceptance of the benefit 
of the Judgment is inconsistent with appealing the Judgment, and Timberline Properties 
has suffered a determent from All Clean's negotiation of the check. 
Although the Judgment has been paid in full, All Clean has refused to execute a 
Satisfaction of Judgment. [Affidavit of Garrett A. Walker ffl| 5-6, attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B"]. Consequently, Timberline Properties was forced to place $3,673.00 in 
escrow in conjunction with its sale of a piece of property not even involved in this lawsuit 
(but located in Weber County where the Judgment had been recorded) since the 
Judgment is still encumbering the property. [Affidavit of Farrell J. DeHart ^ 6-7, 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A"]. These funds are still being held in escrow. [Affidavit of 
Farrell J. DeHart % 8, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"]. Accordingly, Timberline 
Properties has suffered a detriment by not having access to both the money to which it is 
entitled from the sale of this unrelated property and the money it already paid in full 
satisfaction of the Judgment. 
All Clean is also enjoying the benefits of the Judgment (its payment) without 
bearing the burdens of the payment of the Judgment (the release of the judgment lien on a 
parcel of property unrelated to this lawsuit). It this respect it is inequitable for All Clean 
to deny Timberline Properties the benefits associated with paying the Judgment. 
Furthermore, it would be inequitable to allow All Clean to effectively finance its appeal 
(in whole or part) with the funds tendered by Timberline Properties in satisfaction of the 
Judgment. 
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It should be noted that a finding that the elements of waiver, estoppel or mootness 
have been met is not a prerequisite to an application of the acceptance-of-the-benefits 
doctrine. This is evident from the fact that the Utah Supreme Court has never analyzed 
the applicability of the doctrine by listing the elements of waiver, estoppel or mootness. 
Instead, a determination is made whether the benefits of the judgment have been accepted 
and whether the issue on appeal is "separate and distinct" from the issue for which the 
benefits of the judgment were accepted. See, e.g., Jensen v. Eddy, 514 P.2d 1142, 1143 
(Utah 1973). These are the elements of the acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine. 
If these elements are met, the Utah Supreme Court commonly uses phrases such as 
"plaintiff waived his right to appeal" or "defendant is estopped from appealing the 
judgment" or "the controversy is moot" to describe the effect of the acceptance-of-the-
benefits doctrine, not as an indication that the elements of the legal theories of waiver, 
estoppel, or mootness had been met. "We are in agreement with the general rule that if a 
judgment is voluntarily paid, which is accepted, and a judgment satisfied, the controversy 
has become moot and the right to appeal is waived." Id. Similarly, "one who accepts a 
benefit under a judgment is estopped from later attacking the judgment on appeal." See 
Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1987). 
That the acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine is a free-standing legal principal not 
dependent upon the elements of wavier, estoppel or mootness is highlighted by the 
following quotation: 
Although the defendant wrote to the plaintiffs attorney explaining that he did not 
intend to waive his right to appeal..., we held against the defendant, stating: "It 
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is elementary that in case a party to an action accepts the benefits of a judgment in 
his favor . . . he thereby waives his right to have said judgment reviewed on 
appeal." 56 Utah at 193, 188 P. at 1118 (citations omitted). 
Id. (emphasis added). 
"Waiver requires three elements: (1) an existing right, benefit, or advantage; (2) 
knowledge of its existence; and (3) an intention to relinquish the right." Soter's, Inc. v. 
Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan Ass % 857 P.2d 935, 940 (Utah 1993). In light of the 
defendant's letter that he did not intend to waive his right to appeal, it is clear that the 
court's statement that "he thereby waives his right to have said judgment reviewed on 
appeal" was intended to describe the effect of the application of the acceptance-of-the-
benefits doctrine, not that application of the doctrine depended upon the elements of 
waiver. See Trees, 738 P.2d at 613. 
Furthermore, the fact that All Clean refused to execute a Satisfaction of Judgment 
does not preclude application of the acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine. "Formal 
execution of a satisfaction of judgment is not a prerequisite of the principal that voluntary 
acquiescence waives the right to appeal." 4 CJS Appeal & Error § 280 (2007). Although 
the execution of a satisfaction of judgment is relevant evidence tending to prove that the 
right to appeal a judgment has been waived, the Utah Supreme Court has implicitly 
agreed that the existence of a satisfaction of judgment is not a prerequisite to such a 
determination. See Trees, 738 P.2d at 613. 
In Trees there is no mention of any filing of a satisfaction of judgment by either of 
the parties to the dispute. Id. However, Utah Supreme Court still held "that [Lewis] lost 
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his right to appeal by acquiescing in and accepting benefits under the judgment he now 
assails . . . by giving up possession of the property and accepting the money tendered by 
[Trees]." Id. 
In supporting this holding the Utah Supreme Court cited to Hollingsworth v. 
Farmers Insurance Co. and characterized it as a case "finding no right to appeal when 
defendant accepted payment and executed a written satisfaction of judgment notice." Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court was clearly aware that a satisfaction of judgment was presented 
as evidence in Hollingsworth but apparently did not consider its existence a prerequisite 
to finding that Trees "waived his right to appeal" by accepting the benefits of the 
judgment. Id. 
Although All Clean may not have subjectively intended to waive its right to appeal 
by negotiating Timberline Properties' check for the full amount of the judgment, the Utah 
Supreme Court has made clear that ignorance of the acceptance-of-the-benefit doctrine is 
not a defense to its application. 
Although the defendant wrote to the plaintiffs attorney explaining that he did not 
intend to waive his right to appeal. .., [the Utah Supreme Court] held against the 
defendant, stating: "It is elementary that in case a party to an action accepts the 
benefits of a judgment in his favor . . . he thereby waives his right to have said 
judgment reviewed on appeal." 
Id. (quoting Ottenheimer v. Mountain States Supply Co., 188 P. 1117, 1118 (Utah 1920)). 
In this case All Clean's mechanics' lien claim is inextricably tied to its unjust 
enrichment claim. In accepting the money tendered by Timberline Properties in 
satisfaction of the Judgment, All Clean thereby waived its right to appeal the Judgment. 
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Similarly, All Clean should be estopped from now attacking the Judgment on appeal after 
accepting its benefits. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT ALL CLEAN IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO A MECHANICS' LIEN. 
The Court must consider the merits of All Clean's appeal if it holds that All Clean 
did not waive its right to appeal the trial court's judgment or that All Clean is not 
otherwise estopped from attacking the Judgment pursuant to the acceptance-of-the-
benefits doctrine. In denying All Clean's mechanics' lien claim, the trial court held that 
"[t]his is not a mechanic's lien case because the work done by [All Clean] is not the type 
which entitles [All Clean] to have a lien upon the property of [Timberline Properties]." 
[R. 266, 269 (Conclusions of Law f 6)]. 
Entitlement to a mechanics' lien is governed by Utah Code § 38-1-3, which 
provides in relevant part: 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or 
furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, 
alteration, or improvement of any building or structure or improvement to 
any premises in any manner . . . shall have a lien upon the property upon or 
concerning which they have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished 
or rented materials or equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor 
performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented by each 
respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any other person 
acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise . . . . 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-3 (2007). 
Recognizing that mechanics' lien statutes are remedial in nature and consequently 
should be liberally construed, the overwhelming majority of courts have nevertheless 
held that the statute governing entitlement to a mechanics' lien—in this case Utah Code § 
19 
38-1-3—must be strictly construed. "A mechanic's lien statute should be liberally 
construed as to the remedial portion of it, but it must be strictly construed in determining 
the question as to whether the right to a lien exists." Lindemann v. Belden ConsoL Min. 
& Mill. Co., 65 P. 403,404 (Colo. Ct. App. 1901). 
Lakloey contends that when considering its arguments, "the tnal court erred by 
failing to apply the remedial intent and effect of the mechanic's lien statutes." We 
have previously observed that "there is a significant distinction between those 
portions of Alaska mechanics' liens statutes which are remedial in nature, and 
those portions which articulate mandatory conditions precedent to the very 
creation and existence of the lien." These mandatory conditions precedent, such 
as "the determination of who qualifies as a lienholder" are to be "strictly 
construed." 
Lakloey, Inc. v. Ballek, 211 P.3d 662, 665-66 (Alaska 2009). See also, e.g., Midwest 
Biohazard Services, LLC v. Rodgers, 893 N.E.2d 1074, 1077 (Ind. App. 2008) ("Because 
our mechanic's lien statute 'derogates common law, Indiana courts have strictly 
construed it when determining its scope, and, accordingly, those persons entitled to 
acquire and enforce such liens.'") (citation omitted); Crawford Supply Co. v. Schwartz, 
919 N.E.2d 5, 12 (111. Ct. App. 2009) ("Because the rights under the [Mechanics' Lien] 
Act are in derogation of the common law, the steps necessary to invoke those rights must 
be strictly construed. Once a plaintiff has complied with the requirements, however, the 
Act should be liberally construed to accomplish its remedial purpose.") (internal citation 
omitted); DBM Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 170 P.3d 592, 
595 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) ("Not all services that relate to property qualify for a lien, and 
a lien statute is strictly construed to determine whether the lien attaches."); Badger 
Lumber Co., Inc. v. Redd, 583 S.E.2d 76, 79 (W. Va. 2003) ("Mechanics' lien statutes 
20 
must be strictly construed with reference to those requirements upon which the right 
depends and liberally construed with reference to the manner in which the right is 
perfected.") (quotation marks and citation omitted); Nucor Corp. v. Mohr Const Co., 763 
P.2d 754, 755 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) ("Lien law is purely statutory, and the statute is strictly 
construed as to whom it applies."); Port Liberie Partners v. Strober Bros., Inc., 549 A.2d 
72, 74 (N.J. 1988) ("Mechanics and materialman's liens are exclusively statutory in 
origin and provisions of statute giving rise to lien are to be strictly construed, while 
provisions for enforcement of lien thereby created are to be liberally construed."); Hamel 
v. American Continental Corp., 713 P.2d 1152, 1153 (Wyo. 1986) ("Lien laws are strictly 
construed, and their scope cannot be extended."); Robert V. Clapp Co. v. Fox, 178 N.E. 
586, 586 (Ohio 1931) ("Mechanics' lien statutes create rights in derogation of the 
common Taw ancfshould therefore be strictly construedas to the~question whether a lien 
attaches, but their procedural and remedial provisions should be liberally construed, after 
the lien has been created."); Bottomly v. Rector of Grace Church, 2 Cal. 90, 90 (Cal. 
1852) ("This is an action by a material-man, under the mechanics' lien law. . . . The 
language of the act is sufficiently explicit, and must be strictly construed, because it gives 
rights in derogation of the common law."). 
In this case the trial court's conclusion that All Clean was not entitled to a 
mechanics' lien is supported by a correct interpretation of Utah Code § 38-1-3 and an 
application of that interpretation to the trial court's unchallenged findings of fact. 
21 
A. Interpreting Utah Code § 38-1-3. 
The rules governing statutory construction are intended to aid the courts in 
ascertaining the intent of the legislature. 
When interpreting a statute, we turn to standard canons of statutory construction. 
In so doing, our primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent. We first 
look to the plain language of the statute and give effect to that language unless it is 
ambiguous. Only where that language is ambiguous do we consult other sources 
for its meaning. 
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ewart, 2007 UT 52, If 16, 167 P.3d 1011. 
A statute is ambiguous when "its terms are susceptible to more than one 
reasonable interpretation." Hutter v. Dig-It, Inc., 2009 UT 69, Tf 49, 219 P.3d 918. 
"When a statute is ambiguous, we use extrinsic interpretive tools such as policy and 
legislative intent to guide our analysis." R & R Indus. Park, LLC v. Utah Property and 
Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 2008 UT 80, If 25, 199 P.3d 917. 
The interpretation of Utah Code § 38-1-3 proposed by All Clean relies heavily on 
a general dictionary definition for the term "improvement" and assigns it the same 
meaning each time it is used to create "two distinct categories of lienable work." See 
Brief of the Appellant at 33-41. However, the Court must find that Utah Code § 38-1-3 is 
ambiguous (if the Court finds that All Clean's interpretation of section 38-1-3 is 
reasonable) for the following reasons: (1) the term "improvement" is a recognized term 
of art; and (2) the term "improvement" has a subtle difference in meaning each time it is 
used in section 38-1-3. 
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First, the term "improvement" in the context of mechanics5 lien statutes is a term 
of art. See, e.g., In re Payless Cashways, Inc., 230 B.R. 120, 130 (8th Cir. BAP 1999) 
("Improvement is a developed term of art in Minnesota, and elsewhere, meaning work 
that involves both enhancement of capital value of the realty and something permanent in 
nature.") (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court of South Dakota recently cited to 
the 1976 version of Webster's Third International Dictionary while noting: 
An improvement in construction parlance is ordinarily defined as "a permanent 
addition or betterment of real property that enhances its capital value and that 
involves the expenditure of labor or money and is designed to make the property 
more useful or valuable as distinguished from ordinary repairsM" 
Duffield Const, Inc. v. Baldwin, 679 N.W.2d 477, 481 (S.D. 2004) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Webster's Third International Dictionary 1138 (1976)). 
Barron's Law Dictionary defines the term "improvement" as "any development of 
land or buildings through the expenditure of money or labor that is designed to do more 
than merely replace, repair, or restore to the original condition." Barron's Law 
Dictionary, 5th Ed. 243 (2003) (emphasis added). Similarly, American Jurisprudence, 
specifically addressing mechanics' lien statutes, notes that the term "improvement" is 
generally defined "as anything that enhances the value of the land, or as a valuable 
addition made to property or an amelioration in its condition, that amounts to more than 
mere repairs, and is intended to enhance the value, beauty, or utility of the property or to 
adapt it for new or further purposes." 53 AM. JUR. 2d Mechanics' Liens § 55 (1996). 
These definitions of the term "improvement" take into account the context in 
which the term is being used. While there are subtle differences between each definition, 
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they are all consistent to the effect that an "improvement" is something more than 
cleaning, repairs or maintenance (which have the effect of maintaining the value of 
property to what it was immediately prior to the event or events necessitating the 
cleaning, maintenance or repair). 
Second, the punctuation of Utah Code § 38-1-3 and the words surrounding each 
usage of the term "improvement" evidence that the term "improvement" has a subtle 
difference in meaning each time it is used. The term "construction" is a noun that means 
the act or process of constructing. The term "alteration" is a noun that means the act or 
process of altering. In the context of the phrase "construction, alteration, or 
improvement," the term "improvement" is used as a noun to connote the act or process of 
improving, which as set forth above connotes something more than merely the act or 
process of cleaning, repairing or maintaining. 
In contrast, the terms "building" and "structure" are both nouns describing 
physical objects. The word "building" encompasses (among others) houses, apartment 
complexes, and commercial skyscrapers. The word "structure" encompasses (among 
others) fences, sheds, and bridges. In the context of the phrase "any building or structure 
or improvement to any premises in any manner," the term "improvement" is used as a 
noun to connote something physical.2 Sewer and water systems are not buildings or 
2
 All Clean acknowledges, in the context of the former version of section 38-1-3, that the 
phrase "improvement upon land" must "be read in connection with the preceding words 
'building' and 'structure.'" See Brief of the Appellant at 35. The same is true in the 
context of the current version of section 38-1-3 with respect to the phrase "any building 
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structures but they are commonly referred to as "improvements." See, e.g., First of 
Denver Mortg. Investors v. G N. Zundel and Associates, 600 P.2d 521, 525 (Utah 1979).3 
Similarly, rocks and trees used in landscaping may not be buildings or structures but they 
are improvements. 
That the term "improvement" as used in the phrase "any building or structure or 
improvement to any premises in any manner" was intended to connote something 
physical (in contrast to the act or process of improving) is evident when other sections of 
the Mechanics' Lien Act are considered. Statutory provisions should be "interpreted in 
harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with other statutes under the same 
and related chapters." Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist., 2008 UT 70, ^ 35, 194 P.3d 956 
(citation omitted). 
We do so because a statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is 
animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section 
should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce 
a harmonious whole. 
or structure or improvement to any premises in any manner." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 
38-1-3 (2007). 
•j 
All Clean cites this case for the proposition that the Utah Supreme Court "believed that 
factors in determining whether material or services are lienable include 1) whether the 
work enhances the value of the property and 2) whether the work is necessary to make 
residences habitable." See Brief of the Appellant at 45. This characterization of the 
Supreme Court's opinion takes it out of context. At issue was a lien on a subdivision, not 
a single lot. The Supreme Court was only affirming that those contributing to 
subdivision "improvements" such as "sewer and water systems" are entitled to a lien on 
the subdivision. First of Denver Mortg. Investors v. C. N. Zundel and Associates, 600 
P.2d 521 (Utah 1979). 
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Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, f^ 12, 223 P.3d 1128 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
Section 38-1-4 provides that "[t]he liens granted by this chapter shall extend to 
and cover so much of the land whereon such building, structure, or improvement shall 
be made." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-4 (2007) (emphasis added). Here, the legislature 
uses the term "improvement" along with the terms "building" and "structure" in the 
context of something "made" upon "the land." This connotes that an "improvement" is 
something physical. 
Similarly, section 38-1-5 provides that "[t]he liens herein provided for shall relate 
back to, and take effect as of, the time of the commencement to do work or furnish 
materials on the ground for the structure or improvement." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-
1-5 (2007) (emphasis added). Again, furnishing materials for an "improvement" 
connotes that the "improvement" is something physical. 
Section 38-1-8 also provides that "[l]iens against two or more buildings or other 
improvements owned by the same person may be included in one claim." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 38-1-8 (2007) (emphasis added). You cannot "own" the act or process of 
improving, but you can "own" an "improvement" if it connotes something physical. 
Pursuant to the foregoing, and giving due consideration to the usage of the word 
"or" and the placement of commas, each word in the phrase "construction, alteration, or 
improvement" is intended to describe an act or process being applied to "any building [a 
physical object] or structure [a physical object] or improvement [a physical object] to any 
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premises [a single lot, a subdivision, etc.] in any manner." See UTAH CODE ANN. §38-1-
3 (2007). 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing 
or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or 
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in 
any manner . . . shall have a lien upon the property . . . . 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-3 (2007) (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, entitlement to a mechanics' lien is dependent upon whether ones 
services, material, or equipment is used: (1) in the construction (the act of constructing), 
alteration (the act of altering), or improvement (the act of improving) of any building (a 
physical object) in any manner; (2) in the construction (the act of constructing), alteration 
(the act of altering), or improvement (the act of improving) of any structure (a physical 
object) in any manner; or (3) in the construction (the act of constructing), alteration (the 
act of altering), or improvement (the act of improving) of any improvement (a physical 
object) to any premises (lot, subdivision, etc.) in any manner.4 
"Statutory enactments are to be construed as to render all parts thereof relevant 
and meaningful. Likewise, we are compelled to give the statutory language meaning and 
to assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly." Labelle v. McKay Dee Hosp. 
These categories can also be read as follows: (1) in the construction of any building, 
structure, or improvement to any premises in any manner; (2) in the alteration of any 
building, structure, or improvement to any premises in any manner; or (3) in the 
improvement of any building, structure, or improvement to any premises in any manner. 
This alternate way of organizing the categories of entitlement makes no substantive 
difference in the meaning of the terms or the conditions giving rise to entitlement to 
mechanics' liens. 
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Center, 2004 UT 159^ [ 16, 89 P.3d 113 (citations omitted). This interpretation gives 
meaning to each term in the statute. 
In contrast to the foregoing, All Clean relies heavily on a general dictionary 
definition that defines the term "improvement" as "a change or addition which makes 
land more valuable." See Brief of the Appellant at 41. Accordingly, cleaning, 
maintenance and repairs constitute "improvements" since they make what is being 
cleaned, maintained or repaired "more valuable" than immediately preceding the 
cleaning, maintenance or repair. 
However, All Clean's general dictionary definition for the term "improvement" 
has already been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. "Let it be conceded that leveling 
land enhances its value and improves its utility. It does not follow that such leveling 
constitutes an improvement upon land." See Frehner v. Morton, 424 P.2d 446, 449 (Utah 
1967). The Supreme Court clearly did not consider the term "improvement" to mean "a 
change or addition which makes land more valuable" as proposed by All Clean. 
Even the examples of improvements listed by the dictionary from which All Clean 
culled its definition of "improvement" indicate that an "improvement" is more than just 
the "value" added to something by cleaning, maintenance or repairs. It defines 
"improvement" as "a change or addition to land, property, etc. to make it more valuable, 
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such as a house, fence, garage, etc/'5 Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, 2d 
Ed. 917 (1979), attached to the Brief of the Appellant as Exhibit "E" (emphasis added). 
Indeed, All Clean's dictionary definition relates remarkably well with the 
definitions of the term "improvement" set forth above when it is read as a whole ("a 
change or addition to land . . . such as a house, fence, garage, etc.). See, e.g., 53 AM. JUR. 
2d Mechanics' Liens §55 (1996) ("anything that enhances the value of the land, or as a 
valuable addition made to property or an amelioration in its condition, that amounts to 
more than mere repairs, and is intended to enhance the value, beauty, or utility of the 
property or to adapt it for new or further purposes"); Duffield Const., Inc. v. Baldwin, 679 
N.W.2d 477, 481 (S.D. 2004) (emphasis added) (quoting Webster's Third International 
Dictionary 1138 (1976)) ("a permanent addition or betterment of real property that 
enhances its capital value and that involves the expenditure of labor or money and is 
designed to make the property more useful or valuable as distinguished from ordinary 
repairs"). 
In addition, All Clean's broad interpretation of the term "improvement" renders 
most of the statute superfluous. "We will avoid an interpretation which renders portions 
5
 Utah has adopted "Lord Tenterden's Rule," which provides that "where an enumeration 
of specific things is followed by some more general word or phrase, such general word or 
phrase is to be held to refer to things of the same kind with respect to a classification 
which immediately precedes it." See Frehner v. Morton, 424 P.2d 446, 449 (Utah 1967). 
Consequently, the term "etc." in the phrase "such as a house, fence, garage, etc." must 
have been intended to refer to other physical object such as water and sewer lines or 
decks. 
29 
of, or words in, a statute superfluous or inoperative." Labelle v. McKay Dee Hosp. 
Center, 2004 UT 15, H 16, 89 P.3d 113 (citations omitted). If the term "improvement" 
means anything that adds value, including cleaning, maintenance or repairs, then the 
terms "construction" and "alteration" are superfluous since they would always result in 
an "improvement." Similarly, the phrase "construction, alteration, or improvement of 
any building or structure" would be engulfed by the phrase "improvement to any 
premises in any manner." 
All Clean's proposed interpretation of the term "improvement" as anything that 
"adds value" also conflicts with the other sections of the Mechanics' Lien Act referenced 
above relating to the physical nature of an "improvement." See UTAH CODE ANN. §38-
1-4 (2007) ("the land whereon such building, structure, or improvement shall be made"); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-5 (2007) ("furnish materials on the ground for the structure or 
improvement"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-8 (2007) ("buildings or other improvements 
owned"). 
Furthermore, there is nothing the legislative history of the Mechanics' Lien Act 
that would evidence a legislative intent to entitle those performing cleaning, maintenance 
or repairs to a mechanics' lien. The 1973 amendment to Utah Code § 38-1-3 was 
expressly for the purpose of "entitling landscape contractors and nurserymen to the 
benefit of the mechanics' lien laws of this state." See Brief of the Appellant at 36-37 
(emphasis added). Nothing was mentioned of affording the security of a mechanics' lien 
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to those cleaning houses (or carpets), shoveling snow, unclogging drains, washing 
windows, or performing routine maintenance work. 
However, All Clean's interpretation of Utah Code § 38-1-3 would bestow the 
security of a mechanics' lien for these services (and more) and thereby eviscerate the 
explicit limitations imposed by the legislature with respect to mechanics' lien entitlement. 
By articulating exactly how services, material or equipment must be used for one to be 
entitled to a mechanics' lien, the legislature clearly intended to limit the scope of who is 
entitled to a mechanics' lien. All Clean's interpretation of section 38-1-3 knows no 
bounds. 
"One of the cardinal principals of statutory construction is that the courts will look 
to the reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire context and 
subject matter of the statute dealing with the subject." Mountain States Tel & Tel Co, v. 
Payne, 782 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989). "A lien creates an encumbrance on property that 
deprives the owner of his ability to convey clear title and impairs his credit." First Sec. 
Mortg. Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919, 922 (Utah 1981). Utah Code § 38-1-3 was never 
intended to entitle those cleaning houses (or carpets), shoveling snow, unclogging drains, 
washing windows, or performing routine maintenance work to a mechanics' lien. 
B. Applying Section 38-1-3. 
Applying section 38-1-3 as it was intended by the legislature establishes that the 
trial court correctly determined that All Clean was not entitled to a mechanics' lien. 
First, All Clean bore the burden of proving that the "work" or "repair" performed by All 
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Clean was used in a manner that entitled All Clean to a mechanics' lien. See Govert 
Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holding that 
"[t]he burden of proof is on [the lien claimant] to prove that it is entitled to the lien and 
has complied with the statute"). However, the trial court's findings of fact make clear 
that All Clean failed to present evidence sufficient to establish exactly what "work" or 
"repair" was performed by All Clean on the building. 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the trial court intentionally 
characterized the work performed by All Clean generally as "the work" or "the repair." 
[R. 266, 267 (Findings of Fact % 6), 269 (Conclusions of Law ffi[ 5-6)]. All Clean's 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law included the following paragraph 
specifically identifying the work allegedly performed: 
The work done by [All Clean] included the following: blocking and padding 
furniture; equipment setup, take down, and monitoring; water extraction from 
floors; application of antimicrobial agent; operation of air movers (fans) and 
dehumidifiers; and cleaning and deodorizing of carpets. 
[R. 254, 255 (Proposed Findings of Fact ^ 6)]. 
Timberline Properties objected to this proposed finding of fact as follows: 
The Court's ruling from the bench did not include a finding with respect to the 
specific work performed by Plaintiff. The Court only referred to the "work or the 
repair," which is consistent with the evidence submitted inasmuch as Plaintiff did 
not present any testimony with respect to the specific work [] performed. 
[R. 241,242 (Objection to Proposed Finding No. 6)]. On March 16, 2010, the trial court 
held a teleconference with counsel for All Clean and Timberline Properties to review 
Timberline Properties' objections to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
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Law. [R. 253, 253 (Telephone Conference Worksheet); R. 262,262 (Minutes of 
Telephone Conference)]. 
As evidenced by the trial court's ultimate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, Timberline Properties' objection to a specific identification of "the work" or "the 
repairs" allegedly performed by All Clean was well-taken by the trial court. [R. 266, 
266-69 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)]. Indeed, All Clean concedes that 
"[t]he trial court [] refused to make any detailed finding of fact identifying or describing 
'the work done by [All Clean].'" See Brief of the Appellant at 13. 
In light of the failure by All Clean to present evidence sufficient for the trial court 
to identify what "work" or "repair" was performed by All Clean, the trial court could not, 
and this Court cannot on appeal, conclude that the "work" or "repair" performed by All 
Clean was "used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any building or 
structure or improvement to any premises in any manner." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-3. 
All Clean simply failed to meet its burden to prove that the work it performed entitled it 
to a mechanics' lien. 
On appeal, however, All Clean seeks to circumvent its failure to present evidence 
sufficient to convince the trial court of what work it performed by alleging that it "is not 
challenging a finding of fact made by the trial court" but at the same time arguing that 
"the absence of an appropriate finding of fact makes it necessary for [All Clean] to 
marshal the record evidence." See Brief of the Appellant at 21. What All Clean is really 
asking this Court to do (without explicitly asking or meeting its burdens on appeal) is to 
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disregard the trial court's refusal to make a specific finding of fact identifying the work 
allegedly performed by All Clean. 
This request— a thinly-veiled attack on the trial court's findings of fact—must be 
denied for the following reasons: (1) All Clean failed to adequately brief the issue; and 
(2) All Clean failed to adequately marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's 
refusal to specifically identify as "the work" or "the repair" performed by All Clean. 
First, All Clean has not adequately briefed the issue of whether the trial court erred 
in refusing to specifically identify as "the work" or "the repair" performed by All Clean. 
We decline to address several additional issues [the appellant] raised because he 
did not adequately brief those issues. His shortcomings include that he argued 
issues in the brief that were not included in his statement of issues, see Utah 
R.App. P. 24(a)(5); he failed to indicate where in the record the issues were 
preserved for appeal, see id. R. 24(a)(5)(A); [and] he failed to properly brief his 
arguments, see id. R. 24(a)(9) 
Gish v. Yanke, 2010 UT App. 259,1f 3 n.2, 2010 WL 3721867. A review of All Clean's 
brief reveals that it suffers from the same infirmities as the brief referred to in Gish on the 
issue of whether the trial court erred in refusing to specifically identify as "the work" or 
"the repair" performed by All Clean. See Brief of the Appellant. 
Furthermore, All Clean has not marshaled the evidence supporting the trial court's 
finding of fact that All Clean performed an unidentified "work" or "repair." 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires "[a] party 
challenging a fact finding [to] first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding." See also State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, 1j 17, 124 P.3d 235; 
Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg Corp., 2002 UT 94, U 21, 54 P.3d 1177. To 
pass this threshold, parties protesting findings of fact must "marshal all the 
evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is 
legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most 
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favorable to the court below." Clark 2005 UT 75, \ 17, 124 P.3d 235 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, f 24, 
140 P.3d 1200. 
An appellant "must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists." Id. at *[} 77 (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, an appellant 
may not simply review the evidence presented at trial, nor may she "re-argue the 
factual case [she] presented in the trial court." Id. If an appellant argues that no 
evidence supports a factual finding, the burden to marshal does not then shift to 
the appellee; rather, the appellee may prove that the appellant did not meet her 
marshaling burden by presenting a "scintilla" of evidence supporting the district 
court's finding. Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, \ 22, 54 
P.3d 1177. 
Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, f^ 25, 112 P.3d 495. Every "scrap" of evidence includes 
all inferences from the evidence. See State v. Valdez, 203 UT App 100, ^ f 20 n.l 1, 68 
P.3d 1052. 
This does not mean that the party may simply provide an exhaustive review of all 
evidence presented at trial. Id. at \ 12 n. 1. Rather, appellants must provide a 
precisely focused summary of all the evidence supporting the findings they 
challenge. Id. This summary must correlate all particular items of evidence with 
the challenged findings and then convince us that the trial court erred in the 
assessment of that evidence to its findings. W. Valley City v. Majestic Inv., Co., 
818P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct.App.1991). 
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,1}77, 100 P.3d 1177. 
Once the evidence is marshaled, only then is an appellate court in a position to 
fairly evaluate whether the trial court's findings of fact were adequately supported by 
evidence. 
A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. In 
order to establish that a particular finding of fact is clearly erroneous, an appellant 
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must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 
against the clear weight of the evidence. If the evidence is inadequately 
marshaled, [the Utah Supreme Court] assumes that all findings are adequately 
supported by the evidence. 
Id. at Tf 19 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted) (emphasis added); 
see also United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 
35, T| 27, 140 P.3d 1200 ("We repeatedly have warned of the grim consequences parties 
face when they fail to fulfill the marshaling requirement."). 
In this case, All Clean purports to marshal the evidence that "identifies or relates 
to the nature of the work done by [All Clean]." See Brief of Appellant at 21. 
Accordingly, All Clean does not even purport to marshal only the evidence supporting 
the trial court's refusal to specifically identify as "the work" or "the repair" as would be 
required to challenge the trial court's findings of fact. 
Indeed, a cursory review of the "evidence" presented by All Clean reveals that it is 
not "a precisely focused summary of all the evidence supportins the findings" challenged 
by All Clean. Chen, 2004 UT at f^ 77 (emphasis added). To the contrary, most of the 
"evidence" marshaled by All Clean is intended to undermine the trial court's refusal to 
specifically identify as "the work" or "the repair" performed by All Clean. See Brief of 
the Appellant at 24-30. 
In contrast, the evidence supporting the trial court's refusal to specifically identify 
as "the work" or "the repair" performed by All Clean includes Mr. Olsen's testimony that 
he did not have personal knowledge regarding the work performed by All Clean, and 
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Timberline Properties' repeated hearsay objections, which were sustained by the trial 
court each time Mr. Olsen tried to testify regarding the work performed by All Clean. [R. 
295 (Trial Transcript at 21, 24, 26, 29, 32)]. 
Of particular note is the trial court's response to the last of Timberline Properties' 
hearsay objections, which was made at the close of All Clean's presentation of evidence 
regarding "the work" or "the repairs." In response to a question regarding "pages from 
an estimate prepared by Cherie White with Travelers Insurance," Mr. Olsen testified that 
"[t]his represents the value that [Travelers Insurance] put to the scope of work that was 
necessary and performed on this job and work their reimbursement would have been 
based on." [R. 295 (Trial Transcript at 31-32)]. 
Timberline Properties objected to this response as follows: "Your honor, I would 
object to this characterization that it was the work performed on the job. Travelers 
wasn't there, so they don't know what work was performed. And I don't think they 
presented any evidence of what work was actually performed." [R. 295 (Trial Transcript 
at 32)]. The trial court responded "Agreed." [R. 295 (Trial Transcript at 32)]. 
These exchanges with the trial court reveal that the trial court did not believe that 
All Clean had established the exact nature of "the work" or "the repairs" and supports its 
refusal to specifically identify "the work" or "the repair" in its findings of fact. More 
importantly for purposes of this appeal, these portions of the record are not mentioned in 
the section denominated by All Clean as fulfilling the marshalling requirement. See Brief 
of the Appellant at 21-30. 
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It is also noteworthy that All Clean's marshalling of the "evidence" includes 
extraneous portions of the record that were not presented as evidence at trial and that tend 
to undermine the trial court's refusal to specifically identify as "the work" or "the repair" 
performed by All Clean. See Brief of the Appellant at 21-23 (citing to responses to 
interrogatories and All Clean's summary judgment motion). These portions of the record 
are inappropriate for purposes of marshalling the evidence in support of the trial court's 
refusal to specifically identify "the work" or "the repair" in its findings of fact. 
All Clean also mischaracterizes some of the evidence presented to the trial court in 
its "marshalling" section. Although it was established that Mr. Olsen did not possess 
personal knowledge regarding the work performed by All Clean, and the trial court 
upheld Timberline Properties' hearsay objection, All Clean cites to this portion of the 
record and states that it represents "Mr. Olsen stating his general familiarity with the 
work done by [All Clean] on the property of Timberline [Properties]." See Brief of the 
Appellant at 25. The hearsay objection was sustained. [R. 295 (Trial Transcript at 21)]. 
Similarly, no evidence was presented that an insurance company visited the 
property or otherwise witnessed the work performed by All Clean. [R. 295 (Trial 
Transcript)]. As noted above, when Mr. Olsen tried to testify that a document from 
Travelers Insurance "represented] the value that [Travelers Insurance] put to the scope of 
work that was necessary and performed on this job," the trial court sustained Timberline 
Properties' objection. [R. 295 (Trial Transcript at 31-32)]. 
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However, All Clean still cites this section of the record and states that it represents 
"Mr. Olsen stating that the insurance company agreed with the scope of work identified 
by [All Clean] but disagreed with unit pricing." See Brief of the Appellant at 27. All 
Clean also cites testimony given by Mr. Olsen that generally an "insurance adjuster goes 
on site to verify information submitted by [All Clean]," see Brief of the Appellant at 28, 
but this testimony (and the rest of the evidence presented at trial) does not evidence that 
an insurance adjuster came to the Property in this case or that Travelers Insurance had 
any knowledge concerning specifically what "work" or "repairs" were performed on the 
Property in this case. 
Furthermore, All Clean has included the closing arguments of counsel and 
comments made by the trial court as "evidence" regarding "the work" or "the repair" 
performed by All Clean. See Brief of the Appellant at 29-30. These arguments and 
comments do not constitute "evidence" supporting the trial court's findings of fact as is 
required when marshaling the evidence. 
In addition to the foregoing deficiencies in All Clean's attempt to marshal the 
evidence, All Clean has not alleged, let alone demonstrated, that the evidence supporting 
the trial court's findings of fact, when viewing it in a light most favorable to the trial 
court, is legally insufficient to support the finding. See United Park City Mines Co. v. 
Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, f 24, 140 P.3d 1200. Consequently, 
the Court must assume that the trial court was justified in refusing to specifically identify 
the work performed by All Clean and must conclude, as set forth above, that All Clean 
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failed to meet its burden to prove that the work it performed entitled it to a mechanics' 
lien. 
Even if All Clean can successfully argue that the trial court's findings of fact were 
inadequate with regard to "the work" or "the repair" performed by All Clean, the work 
that All Clean seeks for this Court to find it performed was not used in a manner that 
entitles All Clean to a mechanics' lien. According to All Clean, the work performed 
"included moving contents, blocking and padding furniture, water extraction from the 
floor, use of dehumidifiers, application of antimicrobial agent to the wet floor area, use of 
fans or air movers, and cleaning the floor." See Brief of the Appellant at 51. 
Pursuant to the interpretation of Utah Code § 38-1-3 set forth above, the services, 
equipment and materials provided pursuant to these activities were used in the cleaning 
of a mess in a building, not in the construction (the act of constructing), alteration (the act 
of altering), or improvement (the act of improving) of a building (a physical object). 
Furthermore, the services, equipment and materials provided by All Clean were not used 
on a structure (a physical object) or improvement (a physical object) to any premises (lot, 
subdivision, etc.) in any manner. 
Although All Clean repeatedly notes that bacteria and mold growth could have 
occurred in the building,6 the potential that the services they performed prevented 
bacteria or mold growth does not change the nature of those services from cleaning or 
maintaining the building to constructing, altering, or improving the building. A good 
6
 See, e.g., Brief of the Appellant at 7, 9, 32, 51, 52. 
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housecleaner helps prevent bacteria and mold growth by scrubbing down the toilets and 
showers. A good snow remover helps prevent driveways and sidewalks from structural 
damage (cracking) by removing the snow. 
There is simply nothing in the legislative history or otherwise to support a 
conclusion that the legislature intended to allow mechanics' liens for the removal of 
water, dirt, or anything else incident to the cleaning of a building when it used the word 
"improvement" in conjunction with the words "construction" and "alteration." 
Entitlement to a mechanics' lien depends on how services, materials or equipment are 
used. In this case, All Clean's services, materials and equipment were simply not used in 
a manner that entitles All Clean to a mechanics' lien. 
III. ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
"Generally, an attorney fee award is within the court's discretion and will not be 
reversed absent an abuse of discretion." Robertson v. GEM Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 496, 499 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). In Utah, the general rule is that "attorney fees cannot be recovered 
by a prevailing party unless a statute or contract authorizes such an award." Hughes v. 
Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, f 21, 89 P.3d 148. 
Utah Code § 38-1-18 provides that "in any action brought to enforce any lien 
under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' 
fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 38-1-18(1) (2009). "An appeal from a suit brought to enforce a lien qualifies as 
part of 'an action' for purposes of this section." Richards v. Security Pacific Nat. Bank, 
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849 P.2d 606, 612 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). As acknowledged by this Court, "[t]he 
language of this statute is mandatory, not discretionary." Reeves v. Steinfeldt, 915 P.2d 
1073, 1079 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
In this case, Timberline Properties was the "successful party" with respect to All 
Clean's mechanics' lien claim. [R. 266, 269 (Conclusions of Law Tf 6)]. Consequently, 
Timberline Properties should have been awarded its attorneys' fees by the trial court. In 
addition, Timberline Properties should be awarded its attorneys' fees on appeal. See 
Reeves, 915 P.2d at 1079; Richards, 849 P.2d at 612. This is true even if the Court basis 
its decision on the acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine. See, e.g., Trees v. Lewis, 738 
P.2d 612, 614 (Utah 1987). 
42 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Timberline Properties respectfully requests that the 
Court dismiss All Clean's appeal pursuant to the acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine. In 
the alternative, Timberline Properties respectfully requests that the Court affirm the trial 
court's conclusion that All Clean was not entitled to a mechanics' lien and reverse the 
trial court's failure to award Timberline Properties its attorneys' fees relating to All 
Clean's mechanics' lien claim. Timberline Properties also respectfully requests an award 
of its attorneys' fees on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this23*day of December, 2010. 
SMITH KNOWLES, P.C. 
rj > Q K 
Garrett A. Walker 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants 
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I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES AND CROSS-APELLANTS, postage prepaid, to 
the following this y j aay of December, 2010: 
L. Miles LeBaron 
Tyler J. Jensen 
Jacob D. Briggs 
LEBARON & JENSEN, P.C 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee 
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EXHIBIT "A 
Garrett A. Walker (12708) 
Dana T. Farmer (8371) 
SMITH KNOWLES, P.C. 
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200 
Ogden, UT 84403 
Telephone: (801) 476-0303 
Facsimile: (801) 476-0399 
Email: gwalker@smithknowles.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ALL CLEAN, INC., DBA THE FLOOD 
CO., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
\TQ. 
TIMBERLINE PROPERTIES, a Utah 
general partnership; JAMES B. FARRELL, 
an individual; FARRELL J. DEHART, an 
individual; JOHN or JANE DOES 1-5; 
Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF FARRELL J. 
DEHART 
Appellate Case No. 20100394-CA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
I, FARRELL J. DEHART, being first duly sworn upon his oath, hereby depose 
and state as follows: 
1. I am listed as a defendant in the above-captioned matter along with my 
business partner, James B. Farrell, and our partnership, Timberline Properties 
(collectively referred to herein as "Timberline Properties"). 
2. I am personally familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
present dispute between the parties hereto, and have personal knowledge of the testimony 
herein. 
3. The trial court in the above-captioned matter entered a judgment against 
Timberline Properties in the amount of $1,841.07. 
4. On March 22, 2010,1 personally mailed a check to All Clean in the in the 
amount of $ 1,841.07 to satisfy the judgment. 
5. On April 7, 2010, All Clean negotiated the check. A copy of the negotiated 
check is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
6. On May 18, 2010, Timberline Properties sold a piece of property not 
involved in this lawsuit (but located in Weber County where the Judgment had been 
recorded) to a third-party. 
7. In conjunction with that sale, Timberline Properties was forced to place 
$3,673.00 in escrow because the judgment entered by the trial court was still 
encumbering the property even though All Clean had already negotiated the check 
Y \WD DATA\DEHA02\09-0179\A0406367 DOC 2 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A". A copy of the Settlement Statement is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B". 
8. These funds are still being held in escrow. 
DATED this 2/j) day of December, 2010. 
Farrell J. DeHaiL-7 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WEBER 
ss 
) 
On the Is? day of December, 2010, personally appeared before me, Farrell J. 
DeHart, who being by me duly sworn did say that he is the signer of the foregoing 
instrument and who duly acknowledge to me that he eXpejuted the same. 
OAV1DLKNOWLES 
HOTAftt PUBLIC* STATE OlUTAH 
COMMISSION NO. 681090 
COMM. EXP. 12/17/2013 NOTARY PUBLIC 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Z ^ a y of December, 2010. 
SMITH KNOWLES, P.C. 
<
^-©arlaT. Farmer 
Garrett A. Walker 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants 
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A U S Department of Housing 
and Urban Development 
Settlement Statement 
B Type of Loan 
1 [ ) F H A 
4 [ }VA 
2 [ ] F M H A 
5 [ ] Conv Ins 
]Conv Unins 
6 File Number 
148603 
7 Loan Number 
8 Mortgage Ins Case No 
C Note This form is furnished to give you a statement of actual settlement costs Amounts paid to and by the settlement 
agent are shown Items marked ("POC") were paid outside the closing they are shown here for information 
purposes and are not included in the totals 
D Name of Borrower Andrea LLC by Javier Chavez Manager 
E Name of Seller Farrell De Hart General Partner 
James Farrell General Partner 
F Name of Lender Amenca First Credit Union P O Box 9639 Ogden UT 84409 9998 
G Property Location Township Range Weber County Utah 
4874 Hamson Boulevard Ogden UT 84403 
H Settlement Agent 
Place of Settlement 
Bonneville Supencr Title Ogden 
5734 South 14751 ast #100 Ogden UT 84403 
TIN 870431430 
I Settlement Date 5/18/2010 Proration Date 5/19/2010 
100 Gross amount due from borrower 
ttrifa*9m«>tt*** \ i. i ~ » i E*m*Ba&m&*«*>* * TZ^TJ 
400 Gross amount due to seller 
101 Contract sales pnce 1401 Contract sales pnce $650 000 00 
102 Personal property [402 Personal property 
103 Settlement charges to borrower (line 140C) 403 
104 404 
105 405 
m^*w*Mhm##*k* t & a t*^i**i*^*m*ti>+ii MWkMid 
106 City/town taxes [406 City/town taxes 
107 County taxes [407 County taxes 
108 Assessments 1408 Assessments 
109 409 
110 May Rent 5/1/2010 to 5/19/2010 410 May Rent 5/1/2010 to 5/19/2010 3 787 40 
111 411 
112 412 
120 Gross amount due from borrower 
or1r*^Jjjfonhe"bQrrowe^ m WT* [420 Gross amount due to seller 500 ^ e % c « W ^ ^ $653 787 40 
201 Deposit or earnest money 501 Excess deposit (see instructions) 
202 Principal amount of new loan(s) 502 Settlement charges to seller (line 1400) $3 020 00 
203 Existing loan(s) taken subject to 503 Existing loan(s) taken subject to $470 390 21 
204 504 Payoff of first mortgage loan 
205 505 Payoff of second mortgage loan 
206 506 2005 thru 2009 Del Taxes 07 014 0026 $52 742 38 
207 507 2005 thru 2009 Del Taxes 07 014 0025 71 691 79 
208 Seller Carry Back 508 Seller Carry Back $56 657 00 
209 
hMmmtton^mimmkv 9,£tt JSLadBaHJKjttL 
509 Escrow Funds Payoff Judgement Case#08090819: $3 673 00 
m ^ t s l b n l T i s u n a q ^ ^ l t e r % * ^ J F g J~W^ 
210 City/town taxes 510 City/town taxes 
211 County taxes 1/1/2010 to 5/19/2010 511 County taxes 1/1/2010 to 5/19/2010 $4 429 72 













Total paid by/for borrower 520 Total reduction in amount due seller 
WM^^MMS^MM!E 
301 Gross amount due from borrower (line 1201 
302 Less amount paid by/for borrower (line 220) 
303 CASH (X)FROM QTO BORROWER 
Tax proration based on taxes for the proceeding oi estimates of the current year 
jtm^hmamm^mmMKk.mm g f ¥ ¥ 
$662,60410 
601 Gross amount due to seller (line 420) $653 787 40 
602 Less total reduction in amount due seller(fine 520) $662 604 10 
603 CASH (X)FROM QTO SELLER 
m 
$8 816 70 
/ 
EXHIBIT "B" 
Total sales/broker commission 


























Lender s inspection fee 
Mortgage insurance application fee 
Assumption fee 
Tax Service Fee 
809 Underwnting Fee 
810 Document Preparation Fee 
811 Flood Certification Fee 
812 Processing Fee 
813 Account Setup to America First Credit Union 
814 Legal Fees to Amenca First Credit Union 
815 Loan Fee Amenca First Credit Union 
jms teqmred by leloWto be paid jj 7**^*L. $ISM 
901 Interest from 
g g -T-Eg fflBj 
902 Mortgage insurance premium for 




VA Funding Fee 
l e n » & I P hWHMk.. Mi i t 
1001 Hazard insurance 
1002 Mortgage insurance 
1003 City property taxes 
1004 County property taxes 
1005 Annual assessments (maint) 




1101 Settlement or closing fee to Bonneville Supenor Title Company Inc 250 00 
1102 Abstract or title search 
1103 Title examination 
1104 Title insurance binder 
1105 Document preparation to Bonneville Superior Title Company Inc 50 00 
1106 Notary fees 
1107 Attorney s fees to 
includes above items no 
1108 Title insurance to Bonneville Supenor Title Company Inc 2 695 00 
includes above items no 
1109 Lender's coverage 
1110 Owner's coverage $650 000 00 $2 695 00 
1111 Endorsements 111 4 and 103 4 to Bonneville Supenor Title Company Inc 
1112 Counerfee to Bonneville Superior Title Company Inc 25 00 
1113 Reconveyance fee 
1200HJ Gof#mmentrecordftffiand transfer charges 
1201 Recording fees Deed $25 00 Mortgage $45 00 Sub $30 00 
1202 City/county tax/stamps 
1203 State tax7stamps 
1204 Recording Assignment Fee 
1205 
1206 
- Add^al segment cfarges «*»« "W^jF 







1400 Total settlement charges (entered on lines 103 section J and 502 section K) 3 020 00 
and disbursements made on my account or by me in this transaction I further certify that I have received^copy of HUD-1 Set^ eme i^yState^ent 
V-
avedVcopy of HUD-1 SetUe ejiLStaefh< 
Andrea LLC by Javier Chavez, Manager > Hart General 
Hhncd/L *PMJJ./J . 
James Farrell. General Partner 
To the best of my knowledge the HUD 1 Settlement Statement which I have prepared is a true ar>d accurate account of the funds which were received and have been or will be 
disbursed by the undersigned as part of the settlement of this transaction (_/ 
5"- IP~ aLGfO 
Bonneville Superior Title Company Inc Date 
SELLER'S AND/OR PURCHASER'S STATEMENT Seller's and Purchaser's signature hereon acknowledges his/their approval of tax prorations and signifies their 
understanding that prorations were based on taxes for the preceding year, or estimates for the current year and in the event of any change for the current year all necessary 
adjustments must be made between Seller and Purchaser likewise any default in delinquent taxes will be reimbursed to Title Company by the Seller 
Title Company in its capacity as Escrow Agent, is and has been authorized to deposit all funds it receives in this transaction in any finanaal institution, whether affiliated 
or not Such financial institution may provide Title Company computer accounting and audit services directly or through a separate entity which if affiliated with Title Company 
may charge the finanaal institution reasonable and proper compensation therefore and retain any profits therefrom Any escrow fees paid by any party involved in this 
transaction shall only be for checkwnting and input to the computers but not for aforesaid accounting and audit services Title Company shall not be liable for any interest or 
other charges on the earnest money and shall be undc r no duty to invest or reinvest funds held by it at any time Sellers and Purchasers hereby acknowledge and consent to the 
deposit of the escrow money in finanaal institutions with which Title Company has or may have other banking relationships and further consent to the retention by Title Company 
and/or its affiliates of any and all benefits (including advantageous interest rates on loans) Title Company and/or its affiliates may receive from such finanaal institutions by 
reason of their maintenance of said escrow accounts 
ThP narhps havp rparl thp ahnvp <;pntpnop<; rpronni7P that thp rprjtatmn<; hprptn arp matpnal anrpp jn <;amp and rprr»nni7« TJ*IA Cnm/anv is rplvino nn thP *arr»P 
Purchasers/Borrowers Sellers 
Andrea LLC, by Javier Chavez, Manager ^art General PartHer ~~~~~ 
Japfe&Farrell, General Partner 
WARNING It is a crime to knowingly make false statements to the United States on this or ar^y^ther similar form Penalties upon conviction can Include a fine and 
wnpnsonment For details see Title 18 U S Code Section 1001 and Section 1010 
EXHIBIT "B" 
Garrett A. Walker (12708) 
Dana T. Farmer (8371) 
SMITH KNOWLES, P.C. 
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200 
Ogden, UT 84403 
Telephone: (801) 476-0303 
Facsimile: (801) 476-0399 
Email: gwalker@smithknowles.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ALL CLEAN, INC., DBA THE FLOOD 




TIMBERLINE PROPERTIES, a Utah 
general partnership; JAMES B. FARRELL, 
an individual; FARRELL J. DEHART, an 
individual; JOHN or JANE DOES 1-5; 
Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF GARRETT A. 
WALKER 
Appellate Case No. 20100394-CA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
I, GARRETT A. WALKER, being first duly sworn upon his oath, hereby depose 
and state as follows: 
1. I am a licensed member of the Utah State Bar in good standing and have 
served as counsel for the defendants in the above-captioned matter since shortly before 
the bench trial in this matter on February 1, 2010. 
2. As such, I am personally familiar with the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the present dispute between the parties hereto, and have personal knowledge 
of the testimony herein. 
3. The trial court in the above-captioned matter entered a judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff All Clean, Inc. against my client, Timberline Properties, in the amount of 
$1,841.07. 
4. On May 12, 2010,1 communicated with Jacob Briggs, counsel for All 
Clean, and indicated to him that Timberline Properties was selling a piece of property not 
involved in this lawsuit but that was located in Weber County and requested that he 
execute a Satisfaction of Judgment for the purpose of clearing title to the property since I 
had been told by Timberline Properties that a check in the full amount of the judgment 
had been tendered to All Clean and All Clean had negotiated the check. 
5. On May 13, 2010, Jacob Briggs communicated to me that he was hesitant 
to sign a Satisfaction of Judgment. 
Y:\WD_DATA\DEHA02\09-0179\A0406368.DOC 2 
6. As of today, I have still not received a Satisfaction of Judgment from Jacob 
Briggs or anyone else in relation to this case. 
DATED thisZl^lay of December, 2010. 
_Gairett A. Walker 
STATE OF UTAH 




On the & > day of December, 2010, personally appeared before me,ijarrett 
A. Walker, who being by me duly sworn did say that he is the signer of the fo/egojflg 
instrument and who duly acknowledge to me that he executed the sam$ 
DAVID LKNOWLES 
NOTARY PUBLIC • STATE of W W 
COMMISSION NO. 681090 
COMM. EXP. 12/17/2013 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thisZ^ay of December, 2010. 
SMITH KNOWLES, P.C. 
^fe^ULQife^ , 
)snan. Farmer 
Garrett A. Walker 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants 
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